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The purpose of this paper is to review the Braidwood Commission's two reports on the use of TASER conducted energy weapons in Canada and the death of Robert Dziekanski to determine whether the Commission's conclusions and subsequent recommendations constitute sound evidence‐based public policy.

This study analyzes Commissioner Braidwood's eight findings from the first report regarding the medical implications of the use of TASER devices by comparing those findings to the body of scientific, medical, and technical literature on the physiological effects of TASER technology. Additionally, this study reviews the potential ramifications of the Commissioner's recommendations regarding the use of TASER devices in both reports.

Evidence from the existing literature does not support the Commission's findings regarding the medical risks of the use of TASER technology. Recommendations to restrict the use of TASER devices are unlikely to reduce arrest‐related deaths, but they are likely to result in increased injuries to officers and suspects. Other recommendations, including training standards, testing requirements, reporting requirements, medical assistance, and research and review, are consistent with other reviews on the use of TASER technology and are necessary and appropriate to restore public confidence in police use‐of‐force.

The Braidwood Commission recommendations have had an immediate impact on the policies of several police agencies in Canada, including the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, but this study is the first critically to review whether those recommendations constitute formulation of sound evidence‐based public policy.

A distinction must be drawn between a dismissal on the one hand, and on the other a repudiation of a contract of employment as a result of a breach of a fundamental term of that contract. When such a repudiation has been accepted by the innocent party then a termination of employment takes place. Such termination does not constitute dismissal (see London v. James Laidlaw & Sons Ltd (1974) IRLR 136 and Gannon v. J. C. Firth (1976) IRLR 415 EAT).

There are three main objectives of the research presented in this paper: to examine the challenges of using an electronic adverse incident recording and reporting system; to assess the method of using a prevention appraisal and failure model; and to identify the benefits of using quality costs in conjunction with incident reporting systems.

Action diary, documentation and triangulation are used to obtain an understanding of the challenges and critical success factors in using quality costing within an adverse incident recording and reporting system.

The paper provides healthcare professionals with the critical success factors for developing quality costing into an electronic adverse incident recording and reporting system. This approach would provide clinicians, managers and directors with information on patient safety issues following the effective use of data from an electronic adverse incident reporting and recording system.

This paper makes an attempt of using a prevention, appraisal and failure model (PAF) within a quality‐costing framework in relation to improving patient safety within an electronic adverse incident reporting and recording system.

Patient safety has been addressed since 2002 in the health system of New South Wales, Australia via a Safety Improvement Programme (SIP), which took a system‐wide approach. The programme involved two‐day courses to educate healthcare professionals to monitor and report incidents and analyse adverse events by conducting root cause analysis (RCA). This paper aims to predict that all professions would favour SIP but that their work and educational histories would result in doctors holding the least and nurses the most positive attitudes. Alternative hypotheses were that doctors' relative power and other professions' team‐working skills would advantage the respective groups when conducting RCAs.

Responses to a 2005 follow‐up questionnaire survey of doctors (n=53), nurses (209) and allied health staff (59), who had participated in SIP courses, were analysed to compare: their attitudes toward the course; safety skills acquired and applied; perceived benefits of SIP and RCAs; and their experiences conducting RCAs.

Significant differences existed between professions' responses with nurses being the most and doctors the least affirming. Allied health responses resembled those of nurses more than those of doctors. The professions' experiences conducting RCAs (number conducted, leadership, barriers encountered, findings implemented) were similar.

Observational studies are needed to determine possible professional differences in the conduct of RCAs and any ensuing culture change that this may be eliciting.

There is strong professional support for SIPs but less endorsement from doctors, who tend not to prefer the knowledge content and multidisciplinary teaching environment considered optimal for safety improvement education. This is a dilemma that needs to be addressed.

Few longer‐term SIPs' assessments have been realised and the differences between professional groups have not been well quantified. As a result of this paper, benefits of and barriers to conducting RCAs are now more clearly understood.